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Firms in China within the same industry but with different ownership and size have very 
different production functions and can face very different emission regulations and financial 
conditions. This fact has largely been ignored in most of the existing literature on climate 
change. Using a newly augmented Chinese input–output table in which information about 
firm size and ownership are explicitly reported, this paper employs a dynamic computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model to analyze the impact of alternative climate policy designs 
with respect to regulation and financial conditions on heterogeneous firms. The simulation 
results indicate that with a business-as-usual regulatory structure, the effectiveness and 
economic efficiency of climate policies is significantly undermined. Expanding regulation to 
cover additional firms has a first-order effect of improving efficiency. However, 
over-investment in energy technologies in certain firms may decrease the overall efficiency 
of investments and dampen long-term economic growth by competing with other 
fixed-capital investments for financial resources. Therefore, a market-oriented arrangement 
for sharing emission reduction burden and a mechanism for allocating green investment is 
crucial for China to achieve a more ambitious emission target in the long run. 
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ownership are explicitly reported, this paper employs a dynamic computable general equilibrium 
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certain firms may decrease the overall efficiency of  investments and dampen long-term economic 
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1. Introduction 
China has achieved a 20% decrease in its carbon intensity of  economic output during the 
12th Five-Year-Plan (FYP) (2011–2015), which exceeded the target set in the FYP.1 Statistics also 
show downturns in both coal consumption2 and energy-related CO2 emission3 in China for 2015, 
indicating its remarkable progress in greenhouse-gas (GHG) mitigation. And yet, tighter 
mitigation targets are set for the coming years. China has officially submitted its “Intended 
Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC)” to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) in June 2015, presenting its goal of  cutting carbon intensity by 60-65% 
from 2005 levels by 2030. The INDC largely reinforced the commitment made in 2014 for 
China’s CO2 emissions to peak around 2030. Assuming that China fulfills the Copenhagen 
commitment and reduces its CO2 intensity by 40-45% from 2005 levels by 2020, an average 
reduction in CO2 intensity between 3.27% and 4.11% per year is required from 2010 to 2020, 
and between 3.97% and 4.42% from 2020 to 2030.  
China has already achieved significant decarbonization of  its booming economy, with rapid 
improvements in energy efficiency, robust uptake in renewables energy, and quick change in 
industrial structure. Most of  this progress has been made by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
large private firms. The Implementation Plans for Energy Conservation Activities in One-thousand 
Enterprises published in 2003 by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), 
which was the most important governmental arm for setting emission-reduction policies, covers 
only the 1,000 most energy- and emission-intensive firms, mainly SOEs. The applicability of  the 
implementation plan was expanded to the top 10,000 firms in 2011, which still covers only large 
emitters. Although large emitters, mainly SOEs, are the primary target of  policy regulations, most 
of  these SOEs are provided with preferential terms for financing their investment in upgrading 
to energy-efficient technologies and equipment, including no- or low-interest loans and easier 
access to public funds. The limited coverage of  regulation and unbalanced financial conditions 
were intended to lower the monitoring and administration costs and mitigate market risks; but, in 
the meantime, such differences inevitably lead to market distortions that undermine the overall 
effectiveness of  climate change policies, especially when considering the fact that small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have been expanding over the last decade with rapid growth 
both in terms of  the number of  firms and their total scale. According to the statistics in the 
Yearbook of  China Small and Medium Enterprises 2015, SMEs account for 99% of  total firms by 
number, 60% by total output value, and 75% by employment, as well as 42% by total emissions. 
Climate policy enforcement efforts so far in China have left the majority of  smaller and private 
firms unaffected, thus impeding major future breakthroughs in GHG mitigation.  
Generally, emitters can follow two basic strategies to meet GHG emission regulations: 
either adjust their input structure on the production technology frontier, or invest in energy 
                                                   
1 http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-02/23/content_5044990.htm  
2 
http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy/count
ry-and-regional-insights/china.html  
3 
http://www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/pressreleases/2016/march/decoupling-of-global-emissions-
and-economic-growth-confirmed.html  
technology to shift the frontier. The individual choice is determined by firms’ production 
technologies, market conditions, profitability, financing costs, and other factors, which vary both 
within and between industries. For firms that are subject to emission regulation and have access 
to preferential financing (mainly SOEs), investing in upgrading production technologies and 
equipment would be preferred, while other regulated emitters (large-scale private firms) would 
have to rely on substituting energy input with other factors. Unregulated emitters (mainly small 
private firms) are, in contrast, discouraged from taking steps to reduce their emissions given 
lower energy prices, higher financial costs, and the absence of  policy regulation. Diversified 
regulation leads to variance in the marginal abatement cost (MAC) for CO2 across firms and 
decreases the total efficiency of  emission reduction. However, unbalanced green investment also 
diversifies the marginal effects of  making such investments, which decreases the average 
efficiency. Moreover, green investments are competing with other fixed capital investments for 
creating production capacity, which affects long-term economic growth.  
Tighter mitigation targets are set for the coming decades for China. However, since 
low-hanging fruit for emission reductions is becoming rarer, the economy has seen decreasing 
effectiveness of  existing policy tools and increasing costs for further GHG mitigation. The 
emission reduction potential of  SMEs has attracted policymakers’ attention, as can be seen in the 
Ministry of  Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) report on Guidance for Further 
Enforcement of  Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction of  SMEs in 2010. To meet the emission 
targets put forward for the next decade, a package of  climate policy mechanisms has been 
proposed and planned for China, including the establishment of  a national emission trading 
scheme (ETS). However, SMEs are still excluded from the emission markets and the impact of  
partial coverage of  emission regulations and unbalanced financial terms is not currently 
understood as a consequence of  insufficient studies on that topic. In this paper, we intend to fill 
this gap and provide a precise model for the design of  Chinese climate policies.  
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, we review existing literature on related 
topics; in Section 3, we establish a stylized theoretical framework to illustrate the impact of  
partial coverage of  emission constraints and differentiated financial conditions; and in Section 4, 
we briefly introduce the dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model used for the 
numerical analysis. We discuss the simulation results in Section 5 and conclude in section 6.  
2. Literature Review 
The impact of  partial coverage of  climate policy regulations has been intensively studied in 
the literature on carbon leakage (Paltsev, 2001; Kuik & Gerlagh, 2003; Babiker, 2005; Barker et al., 
2007; Okereke & McDaniels, 2012; Lanz et al., 2013; Chen, 2009). Paltsev used a CGE model to 
estimate a 10% leakage under the Kyoto Protocol. However, this area of  research has mainly 
focused on inter-industry and cross-border leakage, while intra-industry leakage is very often 
overlooked, particularly for leakage among heterogeneous firms. However, as mentioned above, 
private firms in China are becoming more significant in terms of  both economic output and 
GHG emission. Neglecting SMEs would not only overlook a huge source of  potential GHG 
mitigation, but also lead to market distortion and undermine policy effectiveness.  
The IFC commissioned ESD China Ltd. (referred to hereinafter as ESD or the Consultant) 
to conduct a “Study on the Potential of  Sustainable Energy Financing for SMEs in China in 2012” 
to identify the priority industrial sectors in provinces with vibrant SME economies where there is 
significant potential for energy savings (IFC, 2012). The study concluded that SMEs in the top 8 
energy-intensive sectors have a total energy-saving capacity of  approximately 229 million tons of  
coal equivalent (TCE) per year, representing approximately 74% of  the total potential 
energy-saving achievable among the 35 industrial sectors included in the 12th FYP. This amount 
of  energy-saving capacity, if  realized, would achieve a total energy cost reduction of  
approximately RMB 446 billion per year. However, SMEs have been overlooked by climate policy 
regulations during the last decade, leaving that large potential for emission reduction unexploited.  
This situation has been made worse by limited access to financial resources for SMEs. Due 
to the relatively high risk profile that SMEs possess, commercial banks and investors are reluctant 
to provide financial support. This situation is exacerbated by uncertainty and information 
asymmetries, lack of  loan guarantees and collateral, and some ambiguities in property rights and 
creditors’ rights in the event of  bankruptcy (Arora, 2009). Tsai (2015) also found that even 
though SMEs represent the backbone of  China’s economy, they lack access to bank credit. 
According to the National Bureau of  Statistics, SMEs account for over 97% of  registered 
industrial firms in China and generate 60% of  GDP. However, larger SOEs receive over 75% of  
loans by amount extended by commercial banks (Zhu & Sanderson, 2009) and account for over 
60% of  publicly listed businesses on China’s stock markets (Zhongguowang, 2012). In 2013, only 
23.2% of  bank loans were extended to SMEs (CBRC, 2014). Access to working capital loans is 
even more restricted: only 4.7% of  short-term loans went to SMEs. SMEs thus rely on a wide 
range of  alternative sources, including informal finance, online peer-to-peer (P2P) platforms, 
registered non-banking financial institutions (NBFIs), and underground financiers. Even with 
interest rates of  up to 30% through unofficial credit sources, many SMEs have no other choice 
for funding.  
Most SMEs have to rely on self-financing, including owners’ capital and corporate revenue. 
Such self-financing often results in firms focusing on short-term profit and may make them 
reluctant to invest in research and development or engage in innovation activities, which tend to 
be long-term in nature. Limited access to financial resources is listed as the second-most severe 
obstacle to innovation in SMEs in China (Zhu et al., 2012). It will also affect emission reduction 
efforts by SMEs since investments in energy efficient technologies and equipment also take a 
long time to pay off.  
Emission reduction behavior of  firms is heterogeneous due to different regulations and 
financial conditions across firms, which has potentially large impacts on the effectiveness and 
economic implication of  climate policies. Unfortunately, the impact of  firm heterogeneity on 
climate policies has not been sufficiently studied. To make precise policy recommendations, we 
need to understand the following question numerically: how and to what extent does firm 
heterogeneity undermine the efficiency of  climate policies and long-term economic growth 
under alternative regulation structures? Detailed data on firm heterogeneity concerning 
production technology, market environment, and policy regulation of  different firms, as well as a 
structural model describing differentiated behavior of  heterogeneous firms, would be helpful for 
understanding the question but are not readily available. In this paper, the authors intend to fill 
this gap by 1) identifying heterogeneous firms from a newly augmented Chinese input–output 
(IO) table (Tang et al., 2014) in which information about both firm size and ownership is 
explicitly reported; 2) specifying the behaviors of  different firms in a dynamic CGE model, and 3) 
estimating the emission and economic effects of  alternative climate policy designs that take firm 
heterogeneity into consideration.  
3. Theoretical Framework 
In this section, we use a stylized theoretical framework to explain the heterogeneous 
behaviors in production- and energy-technology investment of  different firms, and their 
implications for economic performance.  
Assuming that there are i∈I firms in the economy in year t, the production technologies of  
each firm are addressed by using a two-level nested Cobb–Douglas function, as follows:  
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where Yi,t is output; Vi,t is value-added input; and Fi,t is the energy service input produced by 
energy input Ei,t and energy-technology input Hi,t.  
The price vector is denoted as {pi,t, vt, ht, et}, with is elements indicating output price, 
value-added price, energy technology price, and energy price, respectively. Given the production 
technology described in Eq. 1, producers’ optimal decision in a perfectly competitive market 
requires  
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where pi,t=Ai' vt1−αihtαiβetαi(1−β), Ai'=Ai−1αiαi(1−αi)1−αi[ββ(1−β)(1−β)]αi. The outputs of  different 
firms are inputs to produce the final demand commodity, Wt=∏iYi,tγi, (Σ iγ i=1). The 
corresponding demand for the individual commodity is 
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Substituting Eq. 2 and the following market clearance conditions (Eq. 4) into Eq. 3, we can 
close the system and get the equilibrium prices of  factors for each period separately.  
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In an effective market without any distortion, the equilibrium ensures that the 
corresponding marginal revenues of  the inputs of  each firm are identical to factor prices in 
equilibrium. That is,  
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The inter-temporal linkage is determined by energy technology investment in this model, 
which is a part of  the final demand and can be written as 
 ttt WHCNS =+ ˆ ; ttt HHδH ˆ1 += − . Eq. 6 
Equation 6 indicates that the optimal investment matches the following condition: 
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Now we can differentiate the market and regulatory conditions of  firms to analyze firms’ 
heterogeneous behavior. We assume that only a subset of  firms are regulated by emission 
constraints, the cost of  regulated energy input is denominated as et'=θet (θ>1), and regulated 
firms are subsidized for their green investments. The target of  the subsidy is reducing the input 
cost of  energy services (Fi,t) to the no-regulation level so as to restore firm competitiveness. The 
subsidy rate is set as (0<1−ϕ <1), and so the input cost for Fi,t is fi,t=Bi'(ϕht)β(θet)1−β 
(Bi'=β−β(1−β)1−β). To return the cost to the no-regulation level, Bi 'htβet1−β, the subsidy rate is set 
as ϕ=θ(β−1)/β.  
With regulation, the optimal input decision in Eq. 2 is now changed to 
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where p'i,t= ϕαiβθαi(1−β)pi,t. For unregulated firms (indicated by j∈I), θ=ϕ=1; for regulated 
nonsubsidized firms (k∈I), θ>1 and ϕ=1; for regulated subsidized firms (m∈I), θ>1 and 
ϕ=θ(β−1)/β. Thus, the market clearance conditions are: 
.
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The first terms on the right-hand side of  the three equations in Eq. 9 are identical to the 
market clearance condition in the no-regulation scenario (Eq. 4), and the additional terms show 
the impact of  the heterogeneous response of  different firms to unbalanced regulation. 
Compared with the no-regulation scenario, demand is higher for V and H and lower for E, which 
leads to higher v and h but lower e. Table 1 shows the heterogeneous responses of  different 
firms to unbalanced regulation. Unregulated firms tend to use more energy since it is cheaper, 
relative to the no-regulation scenario, to substitute V and H. This leads to carbon leakage. The 
marginal abatement cost for energy input, (θ−1)e, is identical for regulated firms, but the 
approaches may be differentiated. Subsidized firms tend to rely solely on investing in energy 
technology to substitute for energy. The effect of  the subsidy is so strong that energy-technology 
investment also squeezes out the input of  V. Unsubsidized firms must input more V to meet 
their energy constraints, although V becomes more expensive. Thus, energy input would be more 
concentrated in unregulated j firms; energy-technology investments would be more concentrated 
in subsidized m firms. The unbalanced regulations lead to unequal marginal revenues of  energy 
technology and energy input, which shifts the economy from its optimal equilibrium. Aside from 
that, green investments and the enforcement of  the green-investment subsidy also must compete 
with fixed assets investment for financial resources, which affects the long-term economic 
growth path. Analyzing the exact impact of  the dual distortion on economic output requires a 
systematic numerical model, which is introduced in the next section. 
Table 1. Heterogeneous Response of  Firms to Unbalanced Regulation 
Firm θ ϕ MR(V)1 MR(H) MR(E) V H E 
j 1 1 v h e ↓2 ↓ ↑3 
k >1 1 v h θe ↑ ↑ ↓ 
m >1 θ(β−1)/β v ϕh θe ↓ ↑ ↓ 
Note: 1. MR(⋅) stands for Marginal Revenue of  factor input; 
    2. ↓ indicates a decrease in factor input compared with the no-regulation scenario; 
    3. ↑ indicates an increase in factor input compared with the no-regulation scenario. 
4. Model and Data 
We use a CGE model to analyze the impact of  regulation on emissions and economic 
performance, taking firm heterogeneity into consideration. In this section, we provide a brief  
overview of  the model and database.4 The model is a multi-sector one-region recursive dynamic 
CGE model that accounts for multiple firm types, differentiated policy regulation, and 
endogenous energy-technology investment. The model is calibrated to 2010 as the base year. 
Future periods (indicated by t) are simulated on the basis of  the results for the preceding period. 
The model assumes neo-classical macro closure, that is, it assumes full use and employment of  
capital and labor.  
4.1 Data 
The analysis in this paper takes advantage of  a unique database developed by Tang et al. 
(2014). This database, the augmented 2010 Chinese national IO table, includes data on 42 sectors 
                                                   
4 The introduction in this section would be focused on the part related to firm heterogeneity and 
green investment. For other technical detail, please refer to Appendix I or contact the authors. 
(indexed by i) and information on firm heterogeneity. Firms in each industry are distinguished by 
two dimensions (indicated by f): ownership (state-owned, foreign-invested, or domestic private) 
and size (large or small), as shown in Table 2. Tang and colleagues developed a constrained 
optimization method to construct the table by using the official Chinese 2010 IO table (the 
Annual Surveys of  Industrial Production, which contains firm-level information on balance sheets, 
production, ownership, etc., from the National Bureau of  Statistics of  China) and firm-level 
export and import data for 2010 (from China’s General Administration of  Customs). The layout 
of  this augmented IO table is shown in Table 3. To estimate CO2 emissions by sector and firm 
type based on this augmented Chinese IO table, the following steps are taken. We first follow the 
conventional method (Peters et al., 2006) to estimate China’s CO2 emissions from fuel 
combustion in physical terms, using the 2008 Chinese energy-balance table and the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change emission factors. Combining this information with 
the energy input data (in monetary terms) for four energy sectors (coal mining, washing, and 
processing; oil and gas extraction; petroleum processing and coking, and nuclear fuel processing; 
and gas production and supply) from the conventional Chinese national IO table, the CO2 
emissions per CNY of  energy use by energy type can be estimated. Since the energy input data in 
monetary terms by sector and firm type is available in the augmented Chinese IO table, assuming 
that there is no difference in energy price across firms (all firms face the same market price for a 
specific type of  energy – a strong but necessary assumption lacking more detailed and reliable 
energy price data), CO2 emissions by sector and firm type can be estimated.  
Table 2. List of  Firm Types 
SIZE 
OWNERSHIP 
STATE FOREIGN PRIVATE 
LARGE LSOE LFIE LGE 
SMALL SSOE SFIE SME 
Table 3. Structure of  the IO Table with Multiple Firm Types 
 
4.2 Production Technology 
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which is then nested with energy composition (ENG), consisting of  different energy products. 
The value-added and energy composition (VAE) is then nested with the composition of  
intermediaries (M) to produce the final product (Y). The nesting structure is shown in Figure 1. 
The parameters in the nested-CES functions of  each firm type in each industry are calibrated by 
the IO table, which contains firm heterogeneity data as shown in Table 3.  
 
Figure 1. Nesting Structure of  CES Production Function 
The product can be used for consumption (CNS), investment in capital for use in future 
periods (INV), and investment in energy technologies that can increase energy efficiency in both 
the current and future periods (E_TCH).  
4.3 Energy Supply and Emission Accounting 
Six energy industries are included in the model: coal mining, oil extraction, petrochemical, 
thermal power generation, renewable power generation, and natural gas supply. These industries 
produce raw and washed coal (Coal), crude oil (Crude), petroleum (Ptr), electricity (ELE; thermal 
and renewable) and natural gas (NG), respectively. The energy supply is also addressed in a 
nested-CES form, as shown in Figure 2. Energy technology (E_TCH) is also an input for energy 
supply as an extra factor that is substitutable to physical energy input. From this, higher energy 
prices or constraints on energy input would lead to higher demand for energy technology. 
Energy-technology investment is a decision made at the firm level and leakage is not considered 
in the model. E_TCH accumulates in a similar manner as capital.  
 
Figure 2. Energy Nesting Structure 
CO2 emissions from direct combustion of  fossil fuel are accounted for according to policy 
regulations. In other words, electricity usage and fossil fuel input for feed-in-stock in industries 
are not included in CO2 accounting.  
4.4 Investment Decision and Capital Accumulation 
Investment decision is at the firm level: each firm determines its investment demand 
according to profit rate and financial cost, calculated as follows:  
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where gi,f is the desired growth rate of  capital accumulation of  f firms in sector i; gmax and gmin are 
the upper- and lower-bound of  capital growth rate, set exogenously in a logit curve to prevent 
irrationally extreme capital growth. rori,f is the capital rate-of-return of  firm f in industry i. rori,f is 
calculated as follows:  
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where δ is the depreciation rate of  capital, pki,f is the rental price of  firm-specified capital (i.e., 
the profit), and rf is the financial cost, which is differentiated with respect to firm type. a and β 
are parameters estimated from statistical data.  
4.5 Scenarios 
The benchmark for cross-scenario comparison is the business-as-usual (BAU) scenario in 
which mandatory intensity targets are enforced for certain types of  firms to fulfill an exogenously 
determined total intensity target that meets China’s commitment in the INDC. In the BAU 
scenario, the climate regulations cover only SOEs and large private firms and only SOEs have 
access to preferential financial terms. The unbalanced regulatory structure is shown in Table 4. In 
addition to the BAU scenario, the NULL scenario, featuring no policy regulations, is also 
introduced. 
Table 4. Unbalanced Regulation Structure in the BAU Scenario 
 
Note: Regulated firm types are shaded, with the darker shading indicating access to preferential financial 
conditions. 
The purpose of  preferential financial terms and conditions is to encourage green 
investment and increase market competitiveness. In order to replicate that purpose, in the model 
we nullify policy regulation for each period to determine a set of  energy input costs for firms 
“free of  regulation” and then restore the regulations with an endogenous subsidy to SOEs for 
green investment to match their energy input cost to the “free of  regulation” costs. Figure 3 
shows the process.  
 
Figure 3. Simulation Process for Preferential Financial Conditions 
The total intensity target is set to decrease China’s CO2 emission per unit of  GDP by 3.62% 
per year beginning in 2011. This target assures that China will meet the commitment made in its 
INDC to decrease the carbon intensity by 60% from 2005 levels before 2030 (Figure 4).  
STATE FOREIGN PRIVATE
LARGE LSOE LFIE LGE
SMALL SSOE SFIE SME
SCALE
OWNERSHIP
 
Figure 4. China’s Emission Commitments and Intensity Target Setting 
Aside from NULL and BAU scenarios, a third set of  scenarios in which emission trading is 
introduced and alternative settings for regulatory coverage and financial equalization are also 
taken into consideration (Table 5).  
Table 5. Scenarios with Emission Trading 
 
In the partial-coverage scenarios, only SOEs and large private firms are regulated by 
emission constraints and can participate in emission trading; in the full-coverage scenarios, all 
firms are equally regulated and are able to trade their emission in an integrated carbon market. In 
the various financial condition scenarios, the endogenous subsidy for green investment is 
provided for SOEs as in the BAU scenario, while in the equalized scenarios, the subsidy is 
eliminated.  
5. Simulation Results 
In this section, we compare alternative scenarios for their impact on CO2 emissions and 
long-term economic growth in China. We refer to differentiated green investment behavior and 
the efficiency of  heterogeneous firms to explain the differences in emissions and economic 
performance.  
 
Figure 5. Emission Reduction Effect of  Climate Policies 
Note: The emission trajectories are set identically for all scenarios, other than NULL, to assure their 
comparability 
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5.1 Overview of  Emission and Economic Effects 
The model simulation shows that if  China can fulfill its commitment to reduce carbon 
intensity by 60% or more from 2005 levels by 2030, a peak in total emissions can be expected 
around 2030, as shown in Figure 5. The peak level in 2030 is around 12.1 billion t, which is 28.5% 
lower that the potential emissions compared with the NULL scenario.  
 
Figure 6. GDP Loss Compared to NULL Scenario 
Although total emissions are set identically, the economic output in the alternative 
scenarios differs. The average yearly GDP growth under BAU is 6.26%, which is 0.15% lower 
than under NULL, which leads to a 2.9% GDP loss in 2030. Introducing ETS with the original 
regulation structure (ETS_P_D) lowers GDP loss in the early stages, but the loss begins to 
increase faster and surpass that of  BAU after 2028. The average yearly GDP growth under 
ETS_P_D is 6.25%. Expanding the coverage of  regulation (ETS_F_D) or eliminating 
unbalanced subsidy for green investments (ETS_P_E) leads to better economic effects. The 
average GDP growth rate is 6.34% under the ETS_F_D scenario and 6.32% under the 
ETS_P_E scenario. The GDP losses are also lower compared with the BAU and ETS_P_D 
scenarios. Of  course, with a fully balanced regulation structure (ETS_F_E), the ETS generates 
the best economic output with 6.36% annual GDP growth. Figure 6 shows the cross-scenario 
comparison of  the GDP losses5 against the NULL scenario.  
Comparing the economic effect of  the ETS_P_E and ETS_F_D scenarios in Figure 6, we 
can conclude that elimination of  the unbalanced green investment subsidy leads to a better 
economic performance in short-run, but in the long-run, balancing the regulation by expanding 
its coverage to all types of  firms has the first-order effect.  
5.2 Carbon Leakage and Emission Transfer 
In the partial-coverage scenarios, the unbalanced regulation leads to variation in the MAC 
for CO2 across firms. Variation in MAC, on one hand, directly lowers the short-term efficiency 
of  emission reduction efforts, according to classical economics. And on the other hand, it leads 
to diversified incentives for green investments, and thus, affects the long-term efficiency of  green 
investment. The difference in carbon leakage between regulated and unregulated firms in the 
partial-coverage scenarios shows the extent of  regulation-induced distortion, as shown in Figure 
7.  
                                                   
5 GDP loss, rather than GDP, is used since the GDP differences across scenarios are very small compared to the 
absolute level of GDP. Using GDP loss makes the differences more visible in the figure. 
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Figure 7. Carbon Leakage and Emission Transfer Rate 
We can conclude from the figure that the carbon leakage in ETS_P_D is higher than the 
BAU scenario. Considering the fact that the emission target is enforced by using an intensity 
target in the BAU scenario, it implies a hidden output subsidy for emitters who can expand their 
output to acquire more emission permits. Without the subsidy for regulated firms in the 
EST_P_D scenarios, the regulated firms are worse off  in their competition with unregulated 
firms, which leads to higher levels of  leakage. The negative effect of  the higher distortion level in 
ETS_P_D, especially over the long run, overwhelmed the positive effect of  ETS, and led to 
higher economic losses compared to the BAU scenario. Elimination of  the preferential subsidy 
for green investments by SOEs in the ETS_P_E scenario further worsened the competitive 
conditions for regulated firms, and thus intensified the distortion. Although the positive effect of  
elimination of  the unbalanced financial subsidy led to higher economic output in the short run, 
we find a higher growth rate in the GDP loss, as shown in Figure 6.  
Another interesting conclusion we can make from Figure 7 is that the effects of  
eliminating the unbalanced subsidy for green investment in the partial-coverage and full-coverage 
scenarios are actually opposite to one another. Two effects are involved. First, elimination of  the 
subsidy worsens the competitive conditions of  SOEs, and thus tends to be substituted by 
non-state owned firms to a greater extent, which leads to higher leakage. Second, elimination of  
the unbalanced subsidy directs more financial resources to small firms, which encourages 
emission reduction efforts by these firms. The first effect dominates in the partial-coverage 
scenarios, while the latter dominates in the full-coverage scenarios, which causes the opposite net 
effect.  
5.3 Green Investment Allocation and Efficiency 
The unbalanced financial conditions for different firms cause another type of  distortion. 
The partial regulation increases the incentives for green investments in regulated firms, and 
furthermore, the preferential financial conditions further distort green investments toward SOEs. 
As introduced in the theoretical model, the concentration of  green investments in regulated firms, 
especially subsidized SOEs, leads to unequal marginal revenues across firms and decreases the 
average efficiency of  green investments. Aside from that, the higher demand for green 
investments is competing with other fixed capital investments, which will further affect the 
long-term economic growth.  
Figure 8 shows the trajectory of  total green investment (left panel) and its efficiency (right 
panel) to illustrate the argument mentioned above. In the BAU and ETS_P_D scenarios, green 
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investment increases quickly as the emission targets tighten. The total amount of  accumulated 
green investment through 2030 accounts for about 8% of  GDP. However, the efficiency of  
green investment, defined as the change of  CO2 intensity from the NULL scenario divided by 
the amount of  green investment per unit of  energy input, decreases dramatically, especially after 
2025. Both expanding the coverage of  regulation (ETS_F_D) and elimination of  the subsidy for 
SOE green investment (ETS_P_E) lower the total demand for green investments, while at the 
same time, its efficiency is significantly increased. In the ETS_P_E scenario, the accumulated 
green investment accounts for 4.4% of  GDP in 2030 and 5.5% in the ETS_F_D scenario; while 
their efficiency rates in 2030 are 69% and 39% higher than that of  BAU. With the fully balanced 
regulation structure (ETS_F_E), total green investment accounts for 4% of  GDP in 2030, which 
is the lowest among the various scenarios. At the same time, green investment efficiency under 
ETS_F_E is the highest among the scenarios considered, which 84% higher efficiency compared 
with the BAU level.  
 
Figure 8. Total Green Investment and Efficiency 
Note: Green investment efficiency is defined as the change of  CO2 intensity from the NULL scenario divided by 
the amount of  green investment per unit of  energy input. 
Figure 9 shows the distribution of  green investments in 2030. It indicates that with fully 
balanced regulation (ETS_F_E), the total amount of  green investment accounts for about 4% of  
GDP in 2030, the largest share (about one-third) of  which is made in small private firms (i.e., in 
SMEs). However, when small firms are exempted from emission constraints, they lose their 
incentives to make further investments in energy technology. Meanwhile, the higher demand 
from regulated firms for energy technology leads to higher costs for green investments, which 
further discourages green investments in small firms. From Figure 9 we can see that in the 
ETS_P_E scenario, the share of  green investment in regulated firms increases, while the share in 
unregulated small firms decreases. The preferential subsidy for SOEs has a stronger effect in 
distorting the total demand and allocation of  green investment. In the ETS_E_D scenario, the 
share of  green investment decreases in all non-SOE firms, while the share for SOEs increases 
significantly, which overwhelms the decrease in other firms. And in the BAU and ETS_P_D 
scenarios, the joint effect of  this dual distortion further distorts the allocation of  green 
investment. The total amount of  green investment with dual distortion (BAU and ETS_PD) 
accounts for about 8% of  GDP in 2030, of  which more than 65% is invested by SOEs.  
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Figure 9. Total Green Investment (Share of  GDP, 2030) 
5.4 Economic Cost to Implement Green Investment Preference 
The preferential subsidy not only distorts the allocation of  green investment, but also 
requires remarkable public financing resources to implement it. As introduced in the theoretical 
model, the subsidy rate is determined by the gap between the energy input costs of  SOEs in the 
regulated and unregulated scenarios. Figure 10 shows expenditures on the subsidy in the various 
scenarios. The expenditures grow along with the tightening of  the emission targets. In the BAU 
scenario, subsidy expenditures account for 3.2% of  GDP in 2030 and 3.6% in the ETS_P_D 
scenario. The expenditures in the ETS_F_D scenario are significantly lower, at 1.4% of  GDP in 
2030, since small firms share a large burden of  the emission reduction when there is 
full-coverage regulation, which lowers the input cost of  energy for SOEs.  
 
Figure 10. Green Investment Subsidy (Share of  GDP) 
5.5 Implication to the Fulfilment of  Emission Targets 
As shown in Figure 6, with partial regulation coverage and a preferential green investment 
subsidy, the distortion in the allocation of  emission reduction burden and green investment 
across firms leads to greater economic losses. The level of  distortion is partly determined by the 
share of  emissions by regulated firms – as the share of  emissions from regulated firms decreases, 
emission targets must be set more tightly. Meanwhile, the differences between regulated and 
unregulated firms in energy input costs will harm the competitive condition of  regulated firms 
and lower their market share. Thus, the emission targets of  regulated firms need to be further 
tightened to fulfill the same total emission target, which widens the variance in the marketplace. 
The preferential green investment subsidy can, to some extent, compensate for the loss of  
competitiveness in SOEs, but at the same time, it decreases demand for energy, which would 
decrease energy prices and lead to a decrease in the share of  regulated firms’ emission. A 
negative loop is triggered and intensified by the tighter emission target, which accelerates the 
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growth of  economic losses from emission reductions.  
However, the emission reduction commitments made by China are all in terms of  carbon 
intensity. Since it is calculated as emission per unit of  economic output, a decrease in economic 
output would require a corresponding decrease in total emissions to keep up with the intensity 
target. Considering the effect of  the feedback loop of  uneven regulation and emission leakage, 
the unbalanced regulation scenarios significantly limit the potential for China’s emission 
reduction efforts. According to the simulation results, in the BAU scenario the upper bound of  
China’s emission commitment (65% decrease in carbon intensity from 2005 level by 2030) is 
unreachable, as shown in Figure 11. Further tightening the intensity target for regulated firms in 
BAU scenario between 1% and 10% leads to both decreases in total emission and GDP. However, 
the decrease in GDP accelerates as the emission target gets tighter, and surpasses the rate of  total 
emission reduction, which leads to an upward curve in total carbon intensity before reaching the 
target. In the full coverage scenarios, such a situation is not observed.  
 
Figure 11. Implication of  Tighter Emission Targets (BAU, 2022) 
Concluding Remarks 
Firm heterogeneity in production technologies and market conditions leads to variation in 
the responses of  firms to policy regulations, which has significant implications for the 
effectiveness and economic efficiency of  climate change policies. In this paper, we distinguished 
different types of  firms with respect to their ownership type and size by using firm-level survey 
data, and separated them in the form of  an IO table. A multi-sector, multi-period CGE model 
was applied to analyze the behavior of  firms under unbalanced regulation and differentiated 
market conditions. Small private firms are mainly exempt from the emission constraints in the 
current regulatory structure for climate policy, while state-owned firms and large firms must 
follow the regulations and meet mandatory CO2 intensity targets. In addition, a portion of  
regulated firms, mainly SOEs, are provided with preferential financial terms and conditions, 
including low- and no-interest loans and access to public funds, which is done to boost their 
market competitiveness. The numerical model simulation indicates that the exemption of  small 
private firms from policy regulation leads to carbon leakage from regulated to unregulated firms, 
which intensifies the variance among firms in sharing the emission reduction burden and the 
incentives for green investment. SOEs have the highest incentives and make the majority of  
green investments for lowering their CO2 intensity, while other regulated large private firms 
mainly rely on substituting fossil fuel energy with other input factors to fulfill their emission 
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targets. Unregulated firms are discouraged from taking emission reduction efforts and making 
green investments given their lower energy prices and higher green investment costs, which leads 
to carbon leakage from regulated to unregulated firms. The leakage further intensifies the 
variation in emission reduction burden and green investment allocation since it decreases the 
market share of  regulated firms and lowers the average efficiency of  emission reduction efforts 
and green investment. At the same time, higher demand for green investment and subsidy 
expenditures for implementing the preferential financial conditions for SOEs leads to 
competition with other capital investment for financial resources, which affects economic growth 
in the long run. According to the scenario simulation results, the mandatory intensity target in the 
BAU scenario can decrease the total CO2 emission by 30% at the cost of  a 3% GDP loss in 
2030.  
Introducing emission trading does not necessarily lead to higher economic efficiency for 
emission reductions since the trading mechanism can increase leakage from regulated to 
unregulated firms, which intensifies the differences in emission reduction efforts and lowers 
average efficiency, especially in the long run. Elimination of  the preferential subsidy for green 
investment or expanding regulation coverage can significantly increase the economic efficiency 
of  emission reduction. Elimination of  the preferential subsidy for SOEs equalizes the financial 
costs for green investment across firms and mitigates the distortion in the allocation of  green 
investment. In the ETS_P_E scenario, green investment in SOEs is significantly decreased, 
which is mainly shifted to large private firms. While total green investment is 64% lower than in 
the BAU scenario, its average efficiency for improving energy efficiency is 71% higher. Even with 
a lower level of  green investment, the higher efficiency of  green investment combined with the 
reduction in subsidy expenditures leads to a higher economic growth rate (6.32%). Comparatively, 
expanding the regulatory coverage of  emission constraint leads to higher economic efficiency. 
This scenario not only lowers the distortion in the emission reduction burden shared by different 
types of  firms by equalizing the MACs, but also mitigates the misallocation of  green investment 
by narrowing the gap between energy input costs of  different firms. In the ETS_F_D scenario, 
total green investment is higher than that in the ETS_P_E scenario and its efficiency is lower. 
However, small private firms, who are exempted from regulation in the ETS_P_E scenario, 
contributed about 1/3 of  the total emission reduction. Thus, the average yearly GDP growth is 
higher (6.34%). Further, in a perfectly balanced regulatory structure with full coverage of  
emission constraints and equivalent financial conditions for green investment, the economic 
efficiency of  emission reduction is the highest (annual GDP growth at 6.36%) and the total 
efficiency of  green investment is also the highest.  
Summarizing the abovementioned results, we can conclude that under the unbalanced 
regulatory structure, the varying emission reduction strategies of  different type of  firms are 
significantly affecting the effectiveness and economic efficiency of  climate policies in China. 
Expanding the coverage of  regulation has a first-order effect in improving the economic 
efficiency of  emission reduction efforts. On the other hand, overinvestment in energy 
technologies by a small portion of  firms may decrease the total efficiency of  investments and 
dampen long-term economic growth by competing with other fixed-capital investments for 
financial resources. A market-oriented arrangement for determining how firms share emission 
reduction burdens and mechanism for allocating green investment is crucial for China to achieve 
a more ambitious emission target in the long run.  
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